Manchester United produced record revenue without European football in 2025/26. The accounts show an operating recovery taking shape as the club prepares to invest in its next phase.
Manchester United’s latest accounts bring together several parts of the club’s current transition. Revenue reached a club record of £677.6 million, the operating result returned to profit and operating cash generation improved substantially. The year also ended with a £43.0 million loss.
These figures describe different layers of the same year. None, on its own, captures the club’s position particularly well.
The audited accounts for the year to 30 June 2026 show an operating business that has become lighter and more productive. They also show a club carrying substantial debt, paying for past and current squad investment, and beginning to commit capital to a proposed 100,000-seat stadium. Cash was generated. More cash was then directed towards players and property than the business produced during the year.
Taken together, the figures show a club creating more capacity in its day-to-day operations while investing in two connected priorities: the team that must compete now, and the infrastructure intended to support United for decades.
The operating recovery is real
United achieved their record revenue despite the men’s team not playing in a UEFA competition. A third-place Premier League finish lifted broadcasting revenue to £206.8 million, partly offsetting falls in commercial and matchday income. The club hosted ten fewer home matches than in the previous season.
| £m | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 661.8 | 666.5 | 677.6 |
| Operating profit/(loss) | (69.4) | (18.4) | 22.6 |
| Loss for the year | (113.2) | (33.0) | (43.0) |
| Net operating cash inflow | 85.7 | 72.7 | 178.7 |
| Employee benefit expense | 364.7 | 313.3 | 302.0 |
Source: Manchester United plc audited consolidated financial statements. Figures rounded to one decimal place.
Operating expenses fell by £31.8 million. Employee benefit expenses decreased by £11.2 million to £302.0 million, reflecting changes to the first-team squad and the headcount reductions introduced over the previous two financial years. Other operating expenses fell by another £11.2 million. Adjusted EBITDA, the club’s preferred non-IFRS measure of underlying performance, rose 18.4 per cent to £216.4 million.
The result was a £22.6 million operating profit, following losses of £18.4 million in 2025 and £69.4 million in 2024. Any assessment of the restructuring’s human and institutional consequences should not be reduced to a line in the accounts. Financially, however, the direction over these three years is clear.
From operating profit to the final result
Football accounting places several different decisions into the same income statement. United recorded £211.8 million of amortisation, principally relating to player registrations. This is the accounting cost of spreading transfer fees and directly associated acquisition costs across contract lengths; it is not the amount paid for players in cash during the year.
At 30 June, the unamortised value of registrations was £452.3 million. Of that amount, £156.1 million was scheduled to be charged in FY2027 before taking account of the summer’s subsequent arrivals, departures and contract changes. United also recognised £46.9 million of profit on player disposals and £8.2 million of exceptional costs, including costs associated with Ruben Amorim’s departure and the closing stages of the operational restructuring.
Below operating profit, net finance costs reached £69.6 million, up from £21.2 million. That change requires care. Interest on the term loan, secured notes and revolving facilities was £35.6 million, almost unchanged from the previous year. Cash interest paid increased only slightly, from £37.2 million to £38.9 million.
The wider finance line also included an £18.9 million unwinding of discounts on player-registration liabilities, a £10.0 million unrealised foreign-exchange loss on unhedged US-dollar borrowings, transfer-receivable costs and hedge movements. The comparison was made more dramatic by £22.9 million of foreign-exchange gains and £11.4 million of hedge-related income in FY2025. It would therefore be misleading to say that United’s debt interest simply rose from £21 million to £70 million.
After those finance costs and a £4.0 million tax credit, the club reported its £43.0 million loss.
Cash was generated, then invested
The cash-flow statement gives the year a different shape. Net cash generated by operating activities was £178.7 million, more than double the previous year’s £72.7 million. United were not a business unable to turn revenue into cash.
| FY2026 cash movement | £m |
|---|---|
| Net operating cash inflow | +178.7 |
| Cash paid for player registrations and other intangibles | (292.3) |
| Cash received from registration disposals | +148.6 |
| Property, plant and equipment | (85.9) |
| Net financing inflow | +35.3 |
| Exchange-rate effect | (3.3) |
| Change in cash | (18.9) |
Registration cash flows include players and key football-management staff. Totals may differ slightly because of rounding.
The net cash outflow on registrations was £143.7 million, close to the club’s five-year annual average of £146.1 million. A further £85.9 million went into property, plant and equipment. That included £7.7 million at Old Trafford, £14.7 million at Carrington and £63.5 million for freehold property connected to the proposed new stadium.
The accounts do not identify one particular borrowing as the source of the land purchase. Operating cash, player-sale proceeds and financing form a common pool. What can be said is that United generated £178.7 million from operations, spent £229.6 million net on investing activities and ended the year with £67.2 million in cash, £18.9 million less than they had started with.
Extending the financial horizon
At 30 June, United carried £689.0 million of borrowings at book value and reported net debt of £621.7 million. The club had £110 million drawn from a £400 million revolving credit facility, leaving £290 million available.
In June, the club refinanced $425 million of senior secured notes with $550 million of new notes carrying a fixed 5.36 per cent coupon and maturing in 2031. The $225 million term loan was also extended to 2031. This was not a reduction in debt. It moved a maturity away, increased the principal amount of the notes and gave the club more time and liquidity for its next phase.
The transfer balance sheet adds another layer. Recognised payables for registrations stood at £375.0 million, of which £156.7 million was due after more than one year. A further maximum £122.8 million could become payable if specified performance conditions are met. These figures describe instalments and conditional obligations; they are not evidence of overdue payments.
After the year-end, United committed £191.7 million to player and football-staff registrations and contract extensions, payable across the following five years. The revolving facility was drawn further during July and August and partly repaid in September, leaving £200 million outstanding on 21 September. The timing is consistent with a club using its liquidity through a summer transfer cycle, but the filing does not assign individual drawdowns to particular signings.
A stadium project before the financing model
The £63.5 million land purchase is important because it turns the stadium ambition into a balance-sheet commitment. It does not yet tell us how a new ground will be financed, what it will cost or when it will open.
Other European clubs illustrate why that missing architecture matters. Tottenham’s stadium debt is large, but more than 90 per cent of its £851.7 million borrowings were fixed at an average rate of 3.07 per cent in its FY2025 accounts, with an average maturity of 17.6 years. Real Madrid reported €1.108 billion drawn for the Bernabéu project at June 2026; the redeveloped stadium was already producing €363 million of revenue, more than twice its pre-renovation level. Barcelona, still navigating construction and delays, approved €510 million of additional financing within the wider Espai Barça structure, including media notes secured against future broadcasting income.
These are not entries in a financial league table. They are projects at different stages, owned under different structures and reported under different accounting definitions. The useful comparison concerns duration, interest-rate exposure, security and the asset’s eventual earning power.
United remain before that decision. The club has secured land and extended existing debt, but has not published a complete stadium-finance model. Until it does, the land purchase should be read as evidence of intent rather than proof that the project is fully funded.
The next test is what Champions League revenue enables
For FY2027, United forecast revenue of £740 million to £760 million and adjusted EBITDA of £205 million to £225 million. Revenue is expected to rise by between 9.2 and 12.2 per cent; adjusted EBITDA may finish slightly below or slightly above FY2026.
The guidance includes the return of Champions League football and the associated increase in player-staff costs. It does not separate the UEFA effect from new sponsorships, domestic performance, matchday income or retail growth. Calling the entire expected increase “Champions League money” would overstate what the company has disclosed.
The narrow EBITDA range may instead express something fundamental about football economics. Higher revenue is not always intended to become higher profit. Some of it buys the players, wages and depth required to remain in the competition that created the revenue in the first place.
Manchester United’s cultural value cannot be read from net debt, EBITDA or a transfer-payables note. The club matters because of its history, its supporters, its academy, its teams and its place in the city. Finance matters because it determines how securely those things can be carried forward.
FY2026 shows progress, pressure and ambition in the same set of accounts. The operating recovery has given United more capacity to act. The club has begun using that capacity on the squad and the first piece of a possible new home. The next few years will show how successfully those investments support a shared long-term plan.
Method note: Manchester United figures are taken from the audited FY2026 Form 20-F, approved on 24 September 2026, and the company’s FY2026 results release. Adjusted EBITDA is a company-defined non-IFRS measure. Cross-club stadium comparisons use each club’s own published definitions and are not intended as like-for-like rankings.